¹ Department of Philosophy, University of Haifa;

^† This paper was recently rejected by a philosophical journal on the grounds that the editor feared it had the “potential to justify sexual gazes as part of a larger institution of oppression.” He added: “This is not your intention, of course, but it can have that effect.” As if writing philosophy requires us to restrain ourselves out of fear of being misunderstood. He then suggested: “Maybe you could write a paper that examines the more pressing political challenges that women presently confront. I think the readers would be more interested in such a paper.” Later, he went on to propose that I “take a survey of a representative sample of women to see how they feel when a man stares wantonly at them.” To be honest, I was shocked by this response, which fails to distinguish between philosophical inquiry and empirical research and, more importantly, between philosophical reflection and advocacy for social and political goals – important as these might be. This experience echoes a similar one I had when presenting an earlier draft at a prominent political philosophy seminar in Frankfurt. Many participants were hostile to the point of being uncivil, accusing me of “mansplaining.” I suspect we've reached a point where any attempt to interpret feminist concerns differently from the mainstream view is automatically perceived as a moral failing.

* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.