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Political theory has extensively debated the morality of immigration restriction. It has paid little, if any, attention, however, to the question of whether (and if so when) states may permissibly induce (through either forceful or voluntary means) the emigration of lawful residents. This question has recently been made newly salient by real-world political controversies about the proposed “remigration” of migrants and migrant-descended persons in various Western countries. This paper argues that states may sometimes induce remigration, but that the permissibility of doing so is significantly constrained by two principles. Proportionality requires that the end achieved through induced departure justify the moral cost such policies impose on their targets; a mere majority preference is not enough. Maximal Specificity requires that collateral moral costs be avoided whenever feasible. Applying these principles, I show that broadly-targeted, highly coercive remigration programs aiming at ethnic homogeneity as an end in itself are impermissible; but narrowly-targeted, less coercive programs aiming at civic goals are sometimes permissible in principle. Permissible, of course, does not mean all-things-considered justified in any real-world case.

Keywords: immigration; integration; citizenship; exile; denationalization; remigration