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Controversial Ideas, Volume 6, Issue 2 (November 2026)1 Postdoctoral Research Associate, James Madison Program, Princeton University, 83 Prospect Avenue, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Controversial Ideas 2026, 6(2), 14; doi: 10.63466/jci06020014
Received: 18 Feb 2026 / Accepted: 13 Sep 2026 / Published: 10 Nov 2026
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Political theory has extensively debated the morality of immigration restriction. It has paid little, if any, attention, however, to the question of whether (and if so when) states may permissibly induce (through either forceful or voluntary means) the emigration of lawful residents. This question has recently been made newly salient by real-world political controversies about the proposed “remigration” of migrants and migrant-descended persons in various Western countries. This paper argues that states may sometimes induce remigration, but that the permissibility of doing so is significantly constrained by two principles. Proportionality requires that the end achieved through induced departure justify the moral cost such policies impose on their targets; a mere majority preference is not enough. Maximal Specificity requires that collateral moral costs be avoided whenever feasible. Applying these principles, I show that broadly-targeted, highly coercive remigration programs aiming at ethnic homogeneity as an end in itself are impermissible; but narrowly-targeted, less coercive programs aiming at civic goals are sometimes permissible in principle. Permissible, of course, does not mean all-things-considered justified in any real-world case.
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1 Department of Philosophy, The University of St Andrews, St Andrews KY16 9AL, UK
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Controversial Ideas 2026, 6(2), 15; doi: 10.63466/jci06020015
Received: 29 Jun 2026 / Accepted: 24 Oct 2026 / Published: 10 Nov 2026
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This article first discusses the questionable ethics of the debate on the normative relevance of IQ for obligations of refugee protection and outlines conditions for permissible engagement. It then develops the central argument that the deployment of accurate and complete statist and cosmopolitan analyses, that carefully consider both the costs and, importantly, the benefits of refugee protection, can resolve much of the disagreement in the debate on the normative relevance of IQ to obligations of refugee protection. This is because these complete analyses reveal that the benefits of refugee protection within political communities in the Global North are immense, and this is true irrespective of prospective IQ. These immense benefits thereby outweigh even priority-weighted costs. Therefore, states in the Global North have obligations to protect refugees within their political communities on both statist and cosmopolitan grounds, and the purported IQ of those protected is not relevant to those obligations. The article, finally, reinforces the demonstration that any view that IQ is relevant to obligations of protection is false and repugnant.
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1 North Haugh, University of St Andrews, St Andrews KY16 9SX, UK
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Controversial Ideas 2026, 6(2), 16; doi: 10.63466/jci06020016
Received: 22 Jan 2026 / Accepted: 13 Sep 2026 / Published: 10 Nov 2026
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I have two aims here. First, I defend the practice of seriously entertaining “disgusting” ideas in philosophy and ethics, even when the very act of discussion provokes anger or revulsion. I develop three familiar motivations (curiosity, Millian fallibilism, and the historical unreliability of disgust) and add a fourth, a Feyerabendian ethos of proliferation, according to which intellectual health requires the deliberate construction of disruptive alternatives, including positions one does not antecedently endorse. Second, I offer a critique of a recent argument that zoophilia is morally permissible within a broadly antispeciesist and nonanthropocentric framework, and in particular of the claim that some zoophilic acts need not involve animal suffering. I grant much of that argument, yet contend that the conclusion is not robust because it relies on excessive idealization of human psychology. In any world inhabited by humans as they are, the social meaning of zoophilia, together with widespread, refractory disgust responses, predictably produces suffering. My core claim is not that disgust tracks moral truth, but that non-ideal ethical evaluation must treat stable features of human affect as part of the causal structure of suffering. The practical result is a case against normalizing zoophilia (and closely related simulacra). I close by confronting the most obvious objection, that my proposal would justify a “prejudice veto”. I argue that a true sentientist must bite the bullet and admit that even the disgust-mediated suffering of the bigoted and prejudiced deserves moral consideration.
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1 Department of Sociology, Wayne State University, 2228 Faculty/Administration Building (FAB), 656 W. Kirby St., Detroit, MI 48202, USA
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Controversial Ideas 2026, 6(2), 17; doi: 10.63466/jci06020017
Received: 4 Sep 2025 / Accepted: 9 Oct 2026 / Published: 10 Nov 2026
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Since Title IX’s passage in 1972, U.S. high schools have dramatically expanded athletic opportunities for girls. Evaluations of gender equity in school athletics focus on actual participation, ignoring unmet demand among students who wish to participate but were denied the opportunity. Drawing on an exploratory survey of undergraduates at a large Midwestern university about their high-school athletic experiences, this study examines sex differences in participation in formal tryouts and in having been cut from a team. Among respondents with valid data, 73% of males and 59% of females reported having participated in at least one tryout, while 36% of males and 13% of females reported having been cut from a team. In a supplementary logistic regression, adjustment for having participated in a tryout had little effect on the sex differences in being cut: the male odds ratio declined from 3.80 to 3.50. These findings provide initial quantitative evidence of a neglected dimension of Title IX: the exclusion of male students from sports participation. If replicated in larger and more representative samples, large sex differences in unmet demand would have implications for how gender equity in school athletics is understood.
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1 Department of Mathematics, King’s College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK
2 UCL Social Research Institute, University College London, 55–59 Gordon Square, London WC1H 0N, UK;
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Controversial Ideas 2026, 6(2), 19; doi: 10.63466/jci06020019
Received: 15 Nov 2025 / Accepted: 16 Jun 2026 / Published: 10 Nov 2026
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Athena Swan is an award scheme designed to recognise higher education institutions’ (HEIs’) commitment to advancing ‘gender equality’. This paper uses time-series analysis to conduct a replication analysis of the relationship between Athena Swan status and both the proportion of women in senior roles and change in the proportion of women in senior roles. A previous study, using essentially the same data set, found that ‘Athena SWAN members showed greater and faster growth in female representations’. We apply time-series analysis methods to show that effects found in this previous study can be explained by two factors: (1) changes in the set of institutions that hold Athena Swan awards; and (2) the fact that it is more challenging to improve levels of female representation when they are closer to 50%. Once we controlled for these factors, we did not find any impact of Athena Swan awards on changes in the number of women in senior positions over the time-period studied. We conducted a power analysis which places bounds on the maximum size of effects which we would be unable to detect. In addition, we find that institutions with a low proportion of women in senior positions are more likely to be members of Athena Swan and are more likely to hold an award.
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1 Institute of Neurology, University College London, Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, UK
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Controversial Ideas 2026, 6(2), 20; doi: 10.63466/jci06020020
Received: 3 Jan 2026 / Accepted: 25 Sep 2026 / Published: 10 Nov 2026
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The Cass Review (2024) was commissioned by NHS England as an independent review of the medical treatments offered to children with gender-related distress. It concluded that the clinical care for children questioning their gender identity was ‘remarkably weak’. The responses to the Cass Review provide a case study in what happens when a recommended course correction in medicine comes up against strong professional and institutional investment in an existing model of care. Reactions to the Cass Review went well beyond routine professional disagreements about clinical evidence. This paper examines some of the responses to the Cass Review through the lens of recent advances in our understanding of cognitive bias and defensive reasoning. Analyses of the responses reveal how evidence can be filtered through prior belief, group allegiance and efforts to preserve a coherent account of past and present judgement. The paper draws practical lessons from this episode. Cognitive biases are, by their very nature, unconscious but can leave tell-tale traces of their presence in observable behaviours. These can include rapid dismissal of unwelcome findings, disproportionate emotional reactions to disconfirming evidence and those presenting it, asymmetric scrutiny of evidence, shifting rationales to maintain a fixed course of action, and the tendency to treat some evidence as contaminated due to the source while accepting belief-consistent evidence more readily. Measures to minimise the influence of cognitive bias in clinical practice are proposed, including the systematic examination of disconfirming cases and rigorous red team exercises to challenge settled positions. These measures will not work unless they are embedded in a clinical culture where changing one’s mind is treated as a strength and a core feature of evidence-based medicine.
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1 Department of Sociology, Social Policy and Criminology, University of Southampton, Southampton SO17 1BJ, UK
* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Controversial Ideas 2026, 6(2), 18; doi: 10.63466/jci06020018
Received: 12 Aug 2026 / Accepted: 9 Oct 2026 / Published: 10 Nov 2026
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Using critical realism as a resource, this response to Sokal (2026) seeks to reinforce, not undermine, his overall critique in this journal of Simpson and Srinivasan (2018), referencing their justifications for some limited restrictions on academic freedom. With that supportive intention in mind, his use of some terms, such as ‘sociological’ and ‘epistemic’, is brought into question and the omission of a central consideration of ontology is highlighted. Sokal retains an epistemological focus and links this to axiology. If that linkage is also considered in relation to ontology, his arguments would have had greater force. An augmentation of his position with critical realism would vindicate his conclusions but require that positivism, not just postmodernism, is critiqued for the limitations it too places upon truth-inducting activity in higher education. In my view, the defence of academic freedom Sokal adopts would be strengthened by these additional considerations.
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